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THE MILITARY'S EXCLUSION OF
HOMOSEXUALS: AN INDEFENSIBLE POLICY*
Gail Brooke Goldman & Berylin Tancer'"
Not long ago, military concerns of patriotism and
loyalty kept African-Americans from serving with their fellow
Americans in the armed forces. The United States Navy set forth
its justification for banning African-Americans from service in a
1941 Department Memo which stated in part:
The close and intimate conditions of life [in the armed forces],
the necessity for the highest possible degree of unity and
esprit-de-corps; the requirement of morale - all these demand
that nothing be done which may, adversely affect the situation.
Past experience has shown irrefutably that the enlistment of
Negroes other than for mess attendants leads to disruptive and
undermining conditions. It should be pointed out in this
connection that one of the principle objectives by subversive
agents in this country attempting to break down the existing
efficient organization is by demanding participation for
minorities in all aspects of defense, [because] such
participation tends to disrupt present smooth working
organizations... The loyalty and patriotism should be such
that there be no desire on their part to weaken or disrupt the
present organization.'
In keeping with the political temper of the time that claimed unity
through segregation, racial discrimination was rigidly enforced
throughout most of the military. The policy was finally terminated
on July 26, 1948 when President Truman issued his bold executive
'Prepared for publication by Roxana Badin, Brooklyn Law School ("BLS")
Class of 1994. The authors would like to thank Brooklyn Law School Professor
Kathleen O'Neill for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
BLS Class of 1994.
Memorandum G.B. #240 Serial #201, Chairman of the General Board to
Secretary of the Navy, Enlistment of Men of Colored Race in Other Than
Messmen Branch (1941) reprinted in MORRIS MACGREGOR, INTEGRATION OF
THE ARMED FORCES 1940-1965 (1981).
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order establishing equality of treatment and opportunity for all
racial groups in the armed forces.2 The collapse in morale and
disruption of order in the armed services feared by the
segregationists never occurred, nor did the public rise up in arms.
On the contrary, the military overcame its prejudice, as Truman
had anticipated. Today, African-Americans have obtained high-
ranking positions of leadership within the armed services.
3
Admittedly, the road was not always smooth, nor have individual
prejudices fully disappeared.4 However, with the passage of time,
African-American military personnel have been evaluated according
to individual achievement and not skin color.
On January 30, 1993, President Clinton had the opportunity
to step into Mr. Truman's shoes and end the military's present
policy barring homosexuals from serving in the armed forces.5 In
contrast to the bold initiative taken by his predecessor, President
Clinton offered tentative answers and a murky message as he put
the discrimination issue on hold.6  Confronted with strong
opposition to his initial efforts by top military officials,7 President
Clinton implemented a six month waiting period during which the
current policy will be reexamined by members of Congress and the
2 Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948) ("by virtue of the
authority vested in me as ... Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is
hereby ordered ... that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for
all persons in that armed services without regard to race, color, religion or
national origin.").
3 This assertion is evidenced by the appointment of General Colin Powell
who is the first African-American to chair the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
' See Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 959 (1988) (member of National Guard claimed he had been
discriminated against based on his race).
'Gwen 1ill, Clinton Accepts Delay in Lifting Military Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1993 at 1.
61d.
' See John H. Cushman, Jr., Top Military Officers Object to Lifting
Homosexual Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1992, at 9.
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Executive branch.' While the Pentagon and the Legislature
attempt to reach a permanent solution, two interim changes have
been implemented: the military will be enjoined from inquiring
about the sexual preference of new recruits; and, avowed
homosexuals will not be formally discharged, but rather will be
placed in the unpaid standby reserves. 9
During this hiatus, the political branches of the government
will debate the validity of the Department of Defense Directive'o
that purports to explain and justify the military's stance regarding
homosexuals. The Directive reads in pertinent part as follows:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The
presence in the military environment of persons who engage in
homosexual conduct or who by their statements, demonstrate
a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously
impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The
presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the
Armed Forces to...foster mutual trust and confidence among
service members; to ensure the integrity of the system of rank
and command; to facilitate...service of members who
frequently must live and work under conditions affording
minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the armed
forces; to maintain the public acceptability of military service.
Homosexual acts are crimes under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice."
The military's ban against homosexuals resembles past
discriminatory regulations against African-Americans since it
deems a certain class of persons unsuitable for military service.
The Military's interest in maintaining discipline, good order and
8 Id.
9 Gwen Ifill, supra note 5.
10 THEODORE R. SARBIN & KENNETH EB. KAROLS, DEFENSE PERSONNEL
SECURITY RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER, NONCONFORMING SEXUAL
ORIENTATIONS AND MILITARY SUITABILITY A9 (Dec. 1988) (citing Department
of Defense Directive 1332.14 § h. 1) (on file with The Journal of Contemporary
Health Law and Policy).
1 Id.
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morale, the justification for the current ban, are as unfounded as
theories which were applied to exclude African-Americans before
1948. At least two recent scientific studies commissioned by the
Department of Defense refute the notion that gays pose a security
or morale threat.1 2 A 1989 survey commissioned by the military
maintains that: "homosexuals more closely resemble those who
successfully adjust to military life than those who are discharged
for unsuitability." 13 In light of evidence which disproves any
theory of incompatibility, the current directive can be understood
as a regulation which keeps company with racism by excluding
men and women solely because of an immutable characteristic:
their sexual orientation.
And yet, due to the personal nature of one's sexual
preference, the current directive bodes an even more ominous
eclipse to constitutional interests of free speech, due process and
privacy than past regulations which discriminated among service
members according to race. The directive defines a homosexual as
any person who takes part in homosexual activity or anyone who
is not homosexually active, but who, through acts and statements,
manifests a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. 4 The
wide scope of this definition justifies military disqualification
procedures that are deliberately invasive of a person's thoughts,
actions and speech, and leave homosexual service members
defenseless against otherwise unconstitutional violations. Despite
such grave infringements, few if any legal remedies are available
to these members. Courts have continually enforced the directive
in deference to overriding military interests, regardless of whether
the ban was challenged on principles of First Amendment rights,
'2 United States v. Meinhold, 1993 WL 15899 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (citing
Theodore R. Sarbin & Kenneth E. Karols, supra note 10, at 33 and MICHAEL A.
MCDANIEL, PRE SERVICE ADJUSTMENT OF HOMOSEXUAL AND HETEROSEXUAL
lIuTARY ACcEssIONS 19 (1989).
"3 MICHAEL A. MCDANIEL, sutpra note 12, at 19.
14 See THEODORE R. SARBIN & KENNETH E. KAROLS, supra note 10, at A-9.
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procedural and substantive due process or equal protection. 5
Meinhold v. United States Department of Defense
6
represents a new attempt by the courts to end the military ban
using the Equal Protection Clause. In Meinhold, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California rescinded the
plaintiffs discharge and enjoined the military from discharging or
denying enlistment to any person based on sexual orientation. 7
The court found that the Department of Defense did not establish,
by setting forth a factual basis, that its policy is rationally related
to its purported goals.1 8 However, although the district court in
Meinhold refused to defer to the military's justifications for the
policy, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to
invalidate the ban on Equal Protection grounds. 9 While the
Meinhold decision gives hope to homosexual service members, in
reality, the strength of its impact is questionable at best given the
Supreme Court's traditional deference to military interests.20 The
absence of a more permanent solution highlights the need for
courts to apply a more heightened level of scrutiny to the military's
exclusion of homosexuals.
"S See Troy Holroyd, Commentary, Homosexuals and the Military:
Integration or Discriminatory, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 429, 430
(1992).
16 1993 WL 15899 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1993).
'7 Id.
I Id. at 1.
'9 See, Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d. 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Holding that the Army had effectively waived its right to deny Watkins
reenlistment on grounds that he was a homosexual. The majority declined
however, to reach the constitutional issue of whether to apply strict, intermediate
or rational level scrutiny to the military regulation), Id. at 705; compare Watkins
v. United States Army, 847 F.2d. 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) vacated, 875 F.2d 699
(Army's regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against
homosexuals, a suspect class).
'0 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296 (1983).
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This article seeks to illustrate the directive's textual and
subtextual discriminatory policies and to explore the judiciary's
power to effectuate change in the absence of decisive executive or
congressional action. Part one examines the ban's underlying
infirmities and illustrates that the procedures by which the military
implements the directive not only legitimate prejudice but also
violate a homosexual service member's constitutional interests.
Part two suggests that the tradition of judicial deference to military
interests results in an absence of meaningful constitutional analysis
by courts on the issue leaving homosexual soldiers with virtually
no legal redress. Finally, this article concludes that the lack of
sufficient legal protection justifies a court's future decision to
categorize homosexuals as a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause. By recognizing that homosexuals, similar to
African-Americans, have long been discriminated against and lack
the political power to remedy violative discriminatory regulations,
courts should strictly scrutinize and invalidate the military's current
directive.
I. THE ERRORS OF THE DIRECTIVE
The policy barring homosexuals from service allows the
military to exclude potential service members based on their sexual
orientation. The fact that sexual preference, unlike skin
pigmentation, is a discrete trait creates the potential for more
invasive regulations against homosexuals who are enlisted, or who
wish to enlist in the service, than former military policies which
excluded African-Americans. By adhering to a policy which
punishes those who are caught engaging in homosexual activity, as
well as those who are inclined to participate in homosexual
conduct,2 the military uses a "before-the-fact" threat of discharge
to dictate the acceptable behavior of all service members. 22 This
21 THEODORE R. SARBIN & KENNETH E. KAROLS supra note 10 at A-9.
22 See Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing The Military's Exclusion Policy: Text
and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 685, 701 (1992) (".. . the military wants
something more than simply to root out homosexuals. It also wants to root out
effeminate males from the ranks even if they are not homosexual").
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type of "thought policing" policy creates an environment in which
private thoughts and personal attitudes are subject to covert military
censorship.23 It encourages fellow service members to betray
confidences and expose a colleague's proscribed thoughts, the
contents of which could likely result in disqualification from
military service.24
Unlike the policies which excluded African-Americans,
detecting homosexuality often requires the discovery of personal
information about a service member's lifestyle. Therefore, the
manner in which gay service members are uncovered is apt to be
highly intrusive and violative of one's privacy.25 For example,
investigators have violated privacy interests of service members
alleged to be homosexual, or thought to have "gay tendencies," by
following them off base, opening letters from secured mailboxes
and leaking news of the investigation to colleagues.26 Service
members have even been coerced into providing the military with
names of other allegedly homosexual troops, resulting in
procedures analogous to silent "witch hunts" where large groups of
personnel are investigated and discharged."
Homosexuals are induced by threats of discharge to conceal
23 Id. at 695.
' See Judith Hicks Stiehm supra note 22 referring to MARY A. HUMPHREY,
MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE 45-46 (1988) (detailing discharge of a
Naval officer).
25 Michelle Benecke & Kirsten Dodge, Military Women in Non-Traditional
Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 220-21 (1990).
26 Id.
27 Id.
" 'The most well known witch hunts are the Navy's investigations of the
U.S.S. Norton Sound in 1980 and the U.S.S. Yellowstone in 1988, and the
Marine's Parris Island investigation between 1986 and 1988." Judith Hicks
Stiehm, supra note 22, at 697.
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their sexual orientation, and in effect, their identities. 29 Unlike
African-American soldiers who were openly chastised, gays are
"outed" o and subsequently weeded from the military in a manner
shielded from public scrutiny.31 In fact, many homosexual service
members have been honorably discharged from the service in the
interest of avoiding the critical eye of the press and the public. 2
As will be discussed below, under the guise of respectful
dismissals, such honorable discharges allow the military to avoid
granting hearings which set forth reasons for the discharge. By
protecting such information, offensive military procedures of
investigation and disqualification are kept hidden from judicial
scrutiny when discharged plaintiffs seek constitutional protection
in court.
II. THE ABSENCE OF AVAILABLE REMEDIES
Courts have traditionally given the military a high degree
of deference when reviewing military regulations. 3 The Supreme
Court has recognized that "[w]ithin the military community there
is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in the
2 See Judith Hicks Stiehm, supra note 22, at 701.
0 Being "outed" is the practice of exposing to the public that someone is
homosexual after that person has chosen to keep his or her sexual orientation
private. David H. Pollack, Sexual Orientation and the Legal Dilenmas in
"Outing", 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 711 (1992).
31 ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN
AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two 19 (1990).
32 Honorable discharges do not give reasons for the action. So in effect a
person may be discharged from the military for being homosexual without the
record ever setting forth that conclusion.
"3 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (review of First
Amendment challenge to military regulations requires greater deference than in
a civilian context); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (enlisted military
personnel barred from bringing suits against superiors even where such actions
involve alleged constitutional violations).
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larger civilian community," 3 and therefore, "when the Court is
confronted with questions relating to military discipline and
military operations, [it] properly defers to the judgment of those
who must lead our armed forces in battle." 35
Because of this longstanding deference, remedies in equity
available to all military personnel are limited. 6 An example of
the limitations on judicial interference of military practices is civil
tort actions brought against the military by service members.37 In
1950, the Supreme Court held in Feres v. United States38 that the
government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries to service members which arise in the course of military
duty.39 Subsequent to Feres, the Court concluded that tort claims
against the military are barred because these are the "type[s] of
claims that would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs
at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." 40
Moreover, the Court broadened its interpretation of Feres to hold
that military personnel are precluded from maintaining any kind of
damages claim, even where the claim is based on an alleged
constitutional violation. 4' Rather than grounding its limitation on
34 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
3' North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 443 (1990).
' United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); Feres v. United States 340
U.S. 135 (1950).
37 Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (widow of coast guard helicopter pilot brought
wrongful death action against United States alleging that air traffic controller's
negligence caused helicopter crash that killed her husband).
39 Id.
39 Id.
o United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (mother of army private
was barred from bringing wrongful death action for Army's negligence for
failure to warn her son that the service man who kidnapped and killed him had
been previously convicted of murder and manslaughter).
41 See Ciappell, 462 U.S. 296.
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tort claims in legal principles, the Court bases its continued
adherence to the Feres doctrine solely upon the unique nature of
the military:
The need for special regulations in relation to
military discipline, and the consequent need and
justification for a special and exclusive system of
military justice, is too obvious to require extensive
discussion; no military organization can function
without strict discipline and regulation that would be
unacceptable in a civilian setting.4 2
The military discipline rationale requires courts to balance
the military institution's need to insulate itself from judicial
interference against the importance of the plaintiffs rights at issue.
In favor of an exclusive system of military justice, that scale is
always tipped in favor of the military, while courts merely grant a
cursory glance to individual grievances.
The courts' reluctance to interfere with regulations
mandated by the military when the action is brought under the
United States Constitution further intensifies the inadequacy of
legal protection afforded homosexuals. Courts have held that the
Constitution provides no remedy for gay soldiers who are barred
from serving in the armed forces.'3 Consequently, challenges to
the ban by homosexuals based upon First Amendment' or Due
Process'5 grounds have had little success because "in reality the
courts disregard the commands of our Constitution, and bow
instead to the purported requirements of a different master, military
42 Id. at 300.
4' Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied., 494
U.S. 1004 (1990).
"id.
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
905 (1981); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
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discipline." 46 In addressing First Amendment claims, the
Supreme Court has continued its longstanding tradition of
deference to the mission of the military. The result is that concerns
of military security curtail any individual protection usually
afforded by the First Amendment.
A. The First Amendment
In response to First Amendment challenges, the Supreme
Court has long made the distinction between the need for
protection under the First Amendment in civilian and military life:
Speech that is protected in the civil population may
. .. undermine the effectiveness of response to
command. Thus, while members of the military
services are entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment, the different character of the military
community and of the military mission requires a
different application of those protections. The rights
of military men must yield somewhat to meet
certain overriding demands of discipline and duty.
. . Speech likely to interfere with these vital
prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can
be excluded from a military base.47
Due to the special need to restrict First Amendment rights of
members in the military, the path for homosexuals in challenging
the military's regulation is not smoothly paved.
In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,4 Miriam Ben-Shalom, an Army
Reserve sergeant, alleged that her discharge from the Army based
on her admission that she was a lesbian violated her First
4. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
' Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564 (1972)).
881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
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Amendment right of free speech. She argued that the regulation
discharging homosexuals from the military had the chilling effect
of restricting her freedom to make statements regarding her sexual
orientation that would otherwise be constitutionally protected under
civil law.49 The lower court found Ben-Shalom's proclamation of
lesbianism to be protected speech, and that the military's regulation
was broader than necessary to protect its legitimate interest of good
order, morale and discipline.5" On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court's findings and held that "policies that
might not pass constitutional muster if imposed upon a civilian
population will be upheld in the military setting." 51 Aside from
its acceptance of the principle that military interests can override
conventional First Amendment protections, the court refused to
recognize that Ben-Shalom's discharge violated the First
Amendment at all since "it is not speech per se that the regulation
against homosexuality prohibits." 52 The court concluded that the
plaintiff was still free to talk about homosexuality, discuss the
regulation banning homosexuals and even associate with
homosexuals.53 Specifically, the court recognized that the conduct
at issue which makes one ineligible for military service is not the
act of speaking of homosexuality aloud, but rather of identifying
oneself as a homosexual. And, as the court reasoned, although the
regulation might affect speech in some sense, it merely does so
incidentally in the course of achieving overriding military goals of
morale and good order.54
Ben-Shalom suggests that courts will uncritically accept
military justifications for curbing First Amendment rights of
49 Id. at 457.
Io d. at 459.
51 Id. at 461 (stating that the military is different in that it must protect and
defend the United States).
52 Id. at 462.
53 Id.
54 id.
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homosexual service members. In justifying its decision, the
Seventh Circuit echoed the directive's rationale and found that the
plaintiff's forthright admission of homosexuality implied a
propensity to engage in the proscribed conduct. 55 Essentially, the
Seventh Circuit upheld a service member's discharge based solely
on the Military's fear of the effect that the presence of admittedly
homosexual service members might have on the ranks. By refusing
to reevaluate military doctrine and require the military to "assume
the risk" that an avowed homosexual will not damage morale and
detract from the camaraderie of the military unit,56 the Seventh
Circuit's decision leaves homosexual service members without First
Amendment protection for an admission of homosexuality.
B. Procedural Due Process
Homosexuals have also tried to challenge regulations
barring them from service on the grounds that the military ban
violates their right to procedural due process.5 7  The Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "nor [shall any
person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law." 5 When the government, state or federal, tries to deprive
an individual of life, liberty or property, procedural due process
requires that the individual be granted procedural fairness of notice
and the right to a fair hearing.59 In order to successfully attack
the mandatory discharge of homosexuals from the military on
grounds of procedural due process, courts must first be convinced
that there exists a property or liberty interest at stake.6°  In
55 Id. at 460.
56 1d. at 461.
57 Belier, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980); Rich, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir.
1984).,
51 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
See Troy Holroyd, supra note 15, at 430.
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narrowly interpreting the Due Process Clause, courts have been
extremely reluctant to find that homosexuals are deprived of such
interests when discharged from the military.
Honorably discharging gay service members in an attempt
to silence accusations of discrimination enables the military to
exclude those members without a hearing. 6' Rich v. Secretary of
the Army6 2 and Beller v. Middendorf,63 are two cases which held
that honorable discharges of homosexual service members do not
deprive these members of either property or liberty interests, even
in the absence of a hearing ordinarily required by the Due Process
Clause.
In Rich, the plaintiff was honorably discharged from the
military upon his admission of homosexuality.64  The Tenth
Circuit addressed the plaintiff's procedural due process claim by
first determining whether there was a property or liberty claim
involved.65  The court held that the plaintiff did not have a
property right to continue military service since, by identifying
himself as homosexual, he no longer comported with military
regulations.66 Therefore, the military's discharge did not offend
due process of law even though the plaintiff had not been granted
a hearing.67 The court recognized that even in the absence of a
property right, a liberty interest may nevertheless require that the
plaintiff be provided a due process hearing. 68 However, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's liberty interest had not even
6, Rich, 735 F.2d at 1226.
62 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
63 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).





Military's Exclusion of Homosexuals
been violated when the Army released records to the public which
mentioned the plaintiff's homosexuality.69  In proving the
deprivation of a liberty interest, a plaintiff must show that the
"protection of one's good name, reputation, honor and integrity"
has not been deprived as well as "one's freedom to take advantage
of other employment opportunities." 70 Because the plaintiff
consented to the release of the information and personally
publicized the reasons for his discharge, the court concluded that
no liberty interest was impinged upon.7'
In Belier, the court used the same rationale to decide that
the plaintiff, who had been discharged from the Navy for admitting
that he engaged in homosexual acts, could not be afforded
procedural due process protection. The court recognized that the
Navy subjects anyone who engages in homosexual acts to
immediate termination and stated that once the plaintiff admitted
to having done so, he could no longer expect that his employment
would continue.72 After concluding that the plaintiff had no
property interest in continued military service, the court rejected a
liberty interest when it considered whether "the Navy's action
'might seriously damage [the person's] standing and associations
in his community' and would impose a 'stigma or other disability
that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities'".73 In acknowledging that an honorable discharge
does not convey reasons for the service termination, the court held
that such a dismissal would neither stigmatize the plaintiff nor
impair his opportunity to obtain employment elsewhere.74
The military practice of honorable discharge precludes




7' Beller, 632 F.2d at 805.
73 Id. at 806 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
74 Id. at 807.
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legal protection against discrimination because it excuses the
military from granting a hearing that would expose unfair policies
and practices to the courts, the press and public. Moreover, as
Beller illustrates, an honorable discharge prevents a court from
finding a liberty interest necessary to constitutionally invalidate a
service member's dismissal. By adopting an extremely narrow
interpretation of what constitutes both liberty and property interests,
both cases fail to determine whether any procedural safeguards will
satisfy the due process guarantees of the Constitution. Courts
justify this "hands-off' approach by deeming the question of
honorable discharge one that is germane to the function of the
military and not within the province of the court.
C. Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process, as well as procedural due process
is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when an
individual's fundamental liberty is stake. 75 The Supreme Court
has generally limited judicial review of substantive due process to
whether the law at issue is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest. Only where legislation restricts
"fundamental rights" will the Court apply a strict scrutiny analysis
to the challenged regulation.76 Fundamental rights include rights
pertaining to the First Amendment, marriage, procreation, and
family relationships.7
Plaintiffs who have challenged regulations barring
homosexuals from the military argued that the fundamental right to
7' Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (finding that the right to
privacy extends beyond the marital relationship); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that there is a fundamental right to privacy in
a marital relationship); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923)
(finding a fundamental right of parents to educate their children as they chose).
76 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86; Meyer,
262 U.S. at 399-400.
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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privacy should extend to protect homosexual conduct.78  In
Dronenburg v. Zech,79 plaintiff was discharged from the Navy
when he admitted that he was a homosexual. Plaintiff challenged
the regulation which mandated his discharge on the grounds that it
violated his fundamental right to be free from governmental
interference with respect to personal autonomy.': Plaintiff argued
that this right to personal autonomy was firmly established in the
Supreme Court cases of Griswold v. Connecticuts and Roe v.
Wade. 2 However, the court was not persuaded by plaintiff's
argument and limited fundamental rights to include only those
activities which relate to "marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child rearing and education." 83 By
marking the parameters of fundamental rights according to
traditional family values, the court concluded: "it need hardly be
said that none of these covers a right to homosexual conduct." 84
The Supreme Court confirmed its position on fundamental
rights in Bowers v. Hardwick,5 where a 5-4 majority upheld a
Georgia state law criminalizing sodomy. The court followed
Dronenberg in recognizing that the right to privacy is limited to
78 See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391 (D.C. Cir.1984) (rejecting
contention that regulations barring homosexuals from military violates
fundamental right to privacy under due process clause); Belier, 632 F.2d 788
(rejecting argument that regulations barring homosexuals from service violates
plaintiff's substantive due process rights).
79 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
S Id. at 1391.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
s Dronenberg, 741 F.2d at 1395-96.
Mid.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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those activities pertaining to marriage, procreation and family. 6
However, the Court took an even firmer stand against homosexual
rights by directing the focus away from the constitutional issue of
governmental interference on sexual preferences.17 Instead, the
Supreme Court held that a right to homosexual activity could not
be extrapolated from an understanding of fundamental rights that
exclusively encompasses traditional family activities."
In Woodward v. United States,89 the Federal Circuit relied
on Bowers to reject a Navy officer's argument that sexual
orientation was a privacy interest. Woodward was an officer who
had acknowledged homosexual tendencies at the time of his
enlistment.9°  After he had been seen associating with a
homosexual man who was about to be discharged for his sexual
orientation, Woodward was recommended for discharge.91 In its
decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the United States Claims
Court's denial of reinstatement, and used Bowers v. Hardwick to
reject the principle that his homosexuality is protected under the
Constitution as a fundamental right.92
Areas protected by substantive due process directly rely on
the kinds of activities a court is willing to characterize as
fundamental rights. It appears that until justices are willing to
frame the issue of sexual orientation as a right to privacy which
8 Id. at 190-191.
87 ANTHONYRANIERI-BERGER, AN EXAMINATION OF HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND EUROPE 10 (1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors); see also Troy Holroyd, supra note 15, at
429; Tracy Rich, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REv. 773, 793 (1988).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
89 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
' Id. at 1069.
91 Id.
92Id. at 1074-75.
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deserves freedom from governmental interference, rather than an
activity that must comport with traditional social customs,
homosexuals will be unable to secure constitutional protection
against military encroachments.
D. Equal Protection
By bowing to military interests, courts have declined to
secure constitutional rights of free speech and due process for
homosexual service members.93 Such unquestioning reverence
indicates that courts seek to avoid critical discussion on the subject
of military practices altogether. As a result, the survival of the
directive against homosexuals relies on the kind of constitutional
escape which traditional military deference creates. From a legal
perspective, however, a court's talismanic invocation of military
doctrine results in a body of case law which provides little
thoughtful criticism as to whether and how military regulations
comport with constitutional principles. Ironically, for homosexual
service members, the absence of constitutional legal protection is
a mixed blessing. While the Supreme Court finds nothing within
the First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to remedy individual
grievances, the absence of constitutional redress may create an
equal protection defense for homosexuals as a group under the
status of a suspect class.
Ordinarily, when a class of persons is subjected to
discriminatory treatment, the court, under an Equal Protection
analysis, requires that the challenged regulation be rationally related
to a legitimate state goal in order for the law to be constitutionally
valid.94 It has been noted that "[i]n virtually every case in which
rationality review is the standard, the Court upholds the challenged
93 Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d 454.
-' City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985)("legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest"). McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
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law." 95 Currently, the level of scrutiny applied to classifications
based on homosexual conduct or status is the minimal rational
basis test.96 For homosexual service members who contest the
validity of the directive, this standard is highly ineffective once
combined with traditional military deference.97 Therefore, it is
essential for homosexuals to be recognized as a suspect class
because such a classification requires courts to apply a heightened
level of scrutiny to the military's regulation. Under strict scrutiny,
the military must justify its present policy by demonstrating that
the challenged regulation is closely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. 98 As a result, the military would be hard
pressed to argue that a sufficiently compelling interest justifies such
unequal treatment of service members.
In order for homosexual service members to receive a
heightened level of judicial review, they must establish that, as a
group, they deserve suspect class status. Characteristics typical of
a suspect class include a history of discrimination which is caused
by an immutable trait and a lack of political and legal power to
redress the discrimination. Aside from the inadequate protection
which courts have granted under First Amendment and Due Process
principles, homosexuals as a group possess three additional
characteristics traditionally used in designating persons that
constitute a suspect class. First, as Justice Brennan observed, "it
is indisputable that homosexuals have historically been the object
" Harris N. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal
Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57
S.CAL. L. REv. 797, 808 (1984).
9 See e.g., Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 626-29 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing
the equal protection argument in light of decisions after Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
9' See generally Troy Holroyd, supra note 15, at 429; see also Tracy Rich,
supra note 87, at 773.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
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of pernicious and sustained hostility." 99 Homosexuals have been
fired from jobs, excluded from schools, churches and even
housing." Second, it has been argued that homosexuality is an
immutable characteristic.' Courts have construed an immutable
characteristic to be "so central to one's personality that it would be
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to
change it, regardless of how easy that change might be physically." "o
Current research which demonstrates the biological nature of sexual
orientation confirms that homosexuality is an immutable
characteristic. A study in 1991 found that genes which men inherit
from their parents may account for up to 70% of the probability
that a man will be homosexual.' °3
Finally, in determining whether homosexuals lack the
political power to seek redress for their grievances, the Supreme
Court has focused on whether the class is a "discrete and insular
minority." '04 In general, homosexuals as a class are faced with
social, economic and political pressure to conceal their sexual
preference. This results in their inability to make effective use of
9 Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (1988), 1444, cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 111 S.Ct. 384 (1989) (quoting Rowland v. Mad River Local School
Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting from denial of cert.).
'o Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1444.
10, Id.; see generally Natalie Angier, Study Suggests Genes Sway Lesbians'
Sexual Orientation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A21 ('The public is now
getting the idea that there is a mountain of evidence being built to support the
idea that homosexuality is biological ... "); see also Curt Suplee, Brain May
Determine Sexuality, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1991, at Al (scientists found that
genes men inherit from their parents may account for up to 70% of the
probability that a man will be homosexual); Malcolm Gladwell, Genes Tied to
Sexual Orientation, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1991, at Al.
10'2 Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1444.
103 Troy Holroyd, supra note 15, at 459 n. 144, (citing 57 S. CAL. L. REv.
817, 817-21).
'04 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Pller, 457 U.S. at 216, n.14.
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the political process." 105 Within the confines of the military, this
situation is further exacerbated by the military procedures used to
detect and discharge gay service members. "Thought policing"'"
policies and silent "witch hunts" 107 instill fear in homosexual
service members that eliminates any choice of openly admitting
their sexual orientation. Thus, they are forced to conceal their true
identities and live in fear of discovery. This way of life forecloses
any opportunity of their being heard within the hierarchy of the
military and ultimately leads homosexuals to avoid coming forward
and securing their rights. In addition, the military practice of
honorable discharge ironically works to the detriment of gay rights
by eliminating the requirement of a hearing. Without proper
hearings, the public and the courts are left unaware of these service
members' grievances and the danger of public ignorance intensifies
homosexuals' inability to make effective use of the political
process."
Since homosexuals possess the characteristics the Supreme
Court requires when defining a group of persons as a "suspect
class," the military's regulations discriminating against these
service members must be subject to strict scrutiny and therefore
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest."° The military's regulation banning homosexuals from
service will not withstand strict scrutiny because the ban relies on
ambiguous arguments to support its regulations. The prime
motivation for the directive is fear that homosexuals will disrupt
good order, morale and discipline in the armed forces.'
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that prejudice and fear
'oS Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1446.
'06 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
'07 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
'0' Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1446.
'09 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
11o Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 461; see also Defense Directive supra note 10
and accompanying text.
Military's Exclusion of Homosexuals
are not adequate reasons for creating laws and regulations."'
Therefore, the regulation cannot withstand a strict scrutiny analysis.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to constitutional arguments under the First
Amendment and Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause
would provide homosexual service members with legal redress
against invasive military regulations if courts granted these
members the suspect class status they deserve. A strict scrutiny
review would allow courts to review the directive and require that
military regulations be narrowly tailored to achieve compelling
governmental goals. This kind of review prevents courts from
uncritically adopting vague justifications for military
discrimination. Future court decisions should turn to the Equal
Protection Clause in order to furnish long term solutions instead of
temporary panaceas. Essentially, equal protection would give
homosexual service members constitutional harbor from practices
which they endure as a cost of defending these laws. As Justice
O'Connor recognized in United States v. Stanley: "Soldiers ought
not be asked to defend a Constitution indifferent to their essential
human dignity." 112
.. See generally Chad Johnson, A Judicial Blow to the Military's Anti-Gay
Policies: Pruitt v. Cheney, HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 244 (1992); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that racial prejudice cannot justify removing a
child from the custody of its natural mother); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
1i2 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 708 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).

